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Abstract Since the beginning of the 21st century, several national and international
government agencies have initiated organised crime threat assessments. Addition-
ally, a few scholars have published methods to assess the risks and threats of
organised crime. These governmental bodies and scholars claim that their reports
and methods can demonstrate that certain forms of organised crime are more
threatening than others and thus help policy-makers set strategic priorities. In this
article I discuss these claims by examining the reliability and validity of the
operational definitions of the key concepts used, such as organised crime, threat and
risk. This examination reveals that most reports and methods provide insufficient
detail—and sometimes even no details at all—to guarantee the reliability and
validity of their operational definitions. The search for validity is made particularly
difficult by the ambiguity surrounding the concepts of organised crime, threat and
risk, while the concept of cost is less problematic. Moreover, establishing what
constitutes a threat is at its core a normative decision that cannot be left to
intelligence analysts or scientists alone. The challenge ahead lies in acknowledging
the normative framework of organised crime threat assessments and within that
framework maximising the reliability and validity of the operational definitions of
key concepts and related measuring instruments.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the present century an increasing number of domestic and
international law enforcement agencies have begun producing so-called Organised
Crime Threat Assessments (OCTAs). Currently, these ‘future-oriented’ ([20]: 13)
reports are regularly published by the Belgian Criminal Policy Service1 [7], the
Crime Law Soc Change (2010) 54:63–86
DOI 10.1007/s10611-010-9244-7
1The Criminal Policy Service (Dienst voor het Strafrechtelijk Beleid - DSB) is an advisory body which is
part of the Belgian Federal Ministry of Justice. Although the DSB is in charge of publishing the report, the
report is mainly written by the Belgian Federal Police.
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Criminal Intelligence Service Canada [6], the Dutch National Police Intelligence
Service IPOL [20], the Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force [26] the UK
Serious and Organised Crime Agency [34] as well as Europol [13].
The OCTAs often substitute the so-called organised crime (situation) reports,
which many law enforcement agencies had begun publishing in the 1990s and were
mainly based on traditional law enforcement data, such as arrest figures and criminal
cases. The authors and governmental sponsors of the OCTAs explicitly claim that
these reports can provide the readers with new insights about organised crime and its
societal consequences. The Belgian DSB ([7]: 3) and the Dutch IPOL ([20]: 13), for
example, assert that their OCTAs can demonstrate which forms of organised crime
represent a threat for their respective countries—although organised crime is
understood as a set of groups by the first agency and as a set of phenomena by
the second one. Most OCTAs also have the ambition to provide policy-makers with
useful data to set strategic priorities.2 Europol, for example, justified the switch from
organised crime reports (OCR) to the OCTAs with the following words:
Whereas the OCR was primarily focusing on the description of the organised
crime situation in Europe, the OCTA puts an emphasis on the qualitative
assessment of this complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. The OCTA, being
a forward-looking document, will help decision-makers identify strategic
priority areas in the fight against serious and organised crime and to initiate an
intelligence process to define operational targets ([12]: 6).
Similar claims are also advanced by the OCTF ([26]: 3) and SOCA ([34]: 3). Some
of these reports are influential. In, for example, policy documents of the Belgian
Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice [2, 3] and Dutch policy documents frequent
reference is made to the respective OCTAs. The Dutch OCTAs, for instance, are sent
to the Parliament and are used by the Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs to
justify their policies. SOCA’s ([34]: 3) OCTA “is produced to inform UK law
enforcement priorities for tackling serious organised crime and other relevant
initiatives, such as changes in legislation, regulation or policy”.3 Therefore, we
should put these OCTAs through serious study.
The main purpose of this article is to critically review the OCTAs and assess
whether their claims are justified.4 In addition to the six OCTAs already mentioned,
the article also considers three similar forward-looking and evaluative reports on
organised crime, which were produced on an ad hoc basis. Two of them are
organised crime risk assessments made by the Australian Queensland Crime
2 This form of policy-relevant crime analysis is called strategic analysis: ‘Strategic crime analysis is
concerned with long-range problems and planning for long-term projects. Strategic analysts examine long-
term increases or decreases in crime, known as “crime trends”’ ([27]: 7). The alternatives are operational
analysis, aiming at producing reports which can be used by criminal investigators on the work floor, and
tactical analysis, assisting officers and investigators in identifying and understanding immediate crime
problems, happening right now ([21]: 374; [27]: 5–8).
3 See for instance the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s website: http://www.om.nl/actueel/publicaties/land
elijk_parket/@143913/brochure_landelijk/ (26-03-2009). See: the Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs
website: http://www.minbzk.nl/115995/nieuw (22-04-2009) and a letter from the Dutch Minister of Justice
to the Parliament, available at the website of the Dutch Ministry of Justice www.justitie.nl/images/TK%
20Brief%20Nationaal%20Dreigingsbeeld%202008_tcm34-147891.pdf
4 We have limited ourselves to Dutch and English-language reports which were available to us.
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Commission and the Queensland Police Service [28] and the QCC’s successor
agency, the Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland [5] in 1999 and 2004,
respectively. The third one is an assessment of the costs of organised crime carried
out by Richard Dubourg and Stephen Prichard [8] on behalf of the UK Home Office
in 2007. These reports have similar goals as the OCTAs. The Crime and Misconduct
Commission Queensland ([5]: 1), for example, claims it can demonstrate that certain
organised crime markets pose a higher risk than others (see also [28]: 1; [8]: 1).
The article also reviews the limited amount of (English and Dutch) scientific
literature on this topic. During the last decade, in fact, a few scholars have also
demonstrated interest in the development and use of methods to carry out risk and
threat assessments of organised crime [1, 22, 24, 32, 36, 37]. In this subset we will
also consider the Sleipnir method, developed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
[31], as it is a method for assessing the threat of organised crime groups, and not an
OCTA, unlike the reports of the other governmental agencies.5 Most of these authors
also claim that their work can help policy-makers set law enforcement priorities ([1]:
272; [24]: 165, 166; [32]: 2; [36]: 472; [37]: 52; see also [31]: 1). For example, Tom
Vander Beken’s risk-based method aims ‘to make an assessment possible which will
help policy makers set better priorities and take more suitable (preventive) measures
at an earlier stage’ ([36]: 472).
Specifically, the article assesses the reliability and validity of the operational
definitions developed by the OCTAs and similar institutional and scientific
contributions. An operational definition—that is, the definition of a concept in
terms of the operations to be carried out when measuring it—is reliable, when it can
be reproduced ([4]: 541, 543). ‘Good operational definitions are so clearly stated that
two independent researchers, following the same operational definition, will measure
the same concept or variable in exactly the same way’ ([25]: 27). An operational
definition is valid ‘to the extent that it measures the variable or concept in such a
way that it reflects its “true” meaning’ (ibid.). It is important to keep in mind that
validity and reliability cannot be seen separately. An operational definition can only
be valid if it is reliable, but a reliable definition is not necessarily valid.6
The first section of this article provides key information on the nine OCTAs and
similar reports considered (Table 1). The second section analyses how the authors of
the reports have defined their key concepts, organised crime and either threat, cost or
risk, and the way they have operationalised these concepts. In such a way we will
assess both the reliability and validity of these operational definitions. The third
section synthesises the main results of the OCTAs and similar reports. The fourth
section reviews the scientific literature on this topic, assessing the reliability and
validity of the operational definitions developed by the scholars. The fifth section
5 We realize that strictly speaking the Sleipnir method is not developed by an academic and therefore
cannot be considered ‘scientific literature’. However, the method is often referred to in scholarly literature
and therefore we have chosen to discuss it in this article together with the other scholarly literature.
6 Suppose, for example, that a criminologist would try to count football hooligans by counting the people
attending a football match, who wear a football jersey and shout. This criminologist could probably come
up with a reliable operational definition of wearing a football jersey and shouting, which would be
consistent enough that it could be used by other researchers in other football stadiums and deliver similar
results. However, this operational definition is too broad to identify hooligans. Many people wear football
jerseys and shout during a match, but not all of them are hooligans and vice versa.
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presents a few recommendations for an alternative approach. General conclusions
will follow.
Comparing the OCTAs and similar reports
Analysing organised crime situation reports and threat assessments can be a difficult
exercise. Some agencies, such as the CISC [6] and SOCA [34] publish only shorter
or adapted versions of their (full) organised crime reports and do not provide any
information about their methodology. Even when the full reports are made available,
the data, operational definitions and the research methods used remain often hidden
from the general public (see also [23]: 98, 99). Despite these limitations, it is
nevertheless interesting to compare the nine reports selected across a few basic
properties (Table 1).
The frequency with which the reports are published differs. Three of the reports under
scrutiny, namely the two Australian reports Project KRYSTAL: A Strategic Assessment
of Organised Crime in Queensland [28] and ‘Organised Crime Markets in Queens-
land: A Strategic Assessment’ [5] and the report Organised Crime: Revenues,
Economic and Social Costs, and Criminal Assets Available for Seizure, written by
Dubourg and Prichard [8] on behalf of the UK Home Office are once-only exercises.
The two Australian risk assessments will be treated together, because their approach to
organised crime markets is similar. The Dutch National Threat Assessment Serious or
Organised Crime [20] is published once every four years, the United Kingdom Threat
Assessment of Serious Organised Crime [34] and the Belgian Report on Organised
Crime [7] once every two years. Three reports are published yearly: the Annual Report
Organized Crime in Canada [6], the Annual Report and Threat Assessment Organised
Crime in Northern Ireland [26] and the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment [13].
The size of the published reports differs widely, varying from 45 [6] to 261 [20]
pages. As a rule, the longer the report is, the more information it contains. Some of
the reports discussed in this article are merely abstracts to inform the general public
or the media, such as the public version of the UK OCTA [34], while other
contributions, such as the Dutch OCTA [20], seem to have a different audience in
mind, such as policymakers, police employees or academics.
Out of the nine reports analysed, four—namely the OCTAs produced by the CISC
[6], OCTF [26], SOCA [34], and Europol [13]— hardly provide any details on their
data gathering method or method of analysis. Europol, for example, merely states the
following about the methodology of its OCTA: ‘The OCTA is based on a multi-
source approach, including law enforcement and non-law enforcement contributions.
These include various European agencies as well as the private sector’ ([13]: 9). This
lack of information on the methods used in the Europol OCTAs is criticised by
others as well (e.g. [9, 10]).
The five remaining reports that do clarify their data collection methods—namely
the Belgian and Dutch OCTAs [7, 20], the two Australian risk assessments [5, 28]
and Dubourg and Prichard’s cost assessment [8]—all use literature review and expert
interviews as data collection methods. In addition, four of them rely on law
enforcement data in various forms, such as criminal proceedings, intelligence
reports, and other police documents [5, 7, 20, 28].
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The reliability of some of the data, such as the intelligence reports, is difficult if
not impossible to determine. Moreover, law enforcement data always suffer from
problems well-known to criminologists, such as the dark figure [4]. In the case of
organised crime, the dark figure is of special concern, because many forms of
organised crime, such as drug trafficking—are so-called victimless or consensual
crimes. Such crimes are even more underreported than other crimes.
Assessing the reliability and validity of the definition of key concepts
To assess the reliability and validity of the operational definitions used in the
OCTAs, we consider 1) if the key concepts (organised crime, threat, cost or risk) are
clearly defined, 2) if these definitions are clearly and consistently translated into
empirical observables, that is how they are operationalised, and 3) if these
operational definitions measure what they are intended to measure.
Organised crime
Defining organised crime is challenging, because there is no consensus on its
definition. The confusion surrounding the definition of organised crime can be
observed in academic as well as in political and law enforcement discourse (e.g. [14,
15, 18, 38]).7 The authors of the OCTAs have envisaged different strategies to come
to terms with the nebulosity of the concept. However, most of them do not meet the
requirements of reliability and validity, making it difficult to compare the results
with the findings from different OCTAs.
Two law enforcement agencies—Europol [13] and the OCTF [26]—do not provide
a definition of organised crime in their reports. The other agencies approach organised
crime in different ways. The CISC ([6]: 12), DSB ([7]: 5) and SOCA ([34]: 3) define
organised crime as groups. The CMCQ ([5]: 7) defines it as activities. Dubourg and
Prichard’s ([8]: 4) and the QCC’s ([28]: 9) definition encompass both organised crime
activities and groups, while IPOL ([20]: 15) considers organised crime as phenomena.
In addition to these inconsistencies, most definitions given are broad and vague and
hence not properly operationalised. The IPOL report, for example, defines organised
crime as follows: ‘Criminal phenomena that come into existence by 1) the structural
cooperation between persons and 2) are committed for financial or material gain’ ([20]:
15; my translation). The imprecision of this definition lies in the fact that many
criminal phenomena would fall under it. ‘Structural cooperation’, for instance, can be
interpreted in different ways. Two persons committing several burglaries as well as
shoplifting could be labelled as organised crime. The addition ‘financial or material
gain’ only excludes crimes of passion, lust, ideology or revenge.
Similarly, all other definitions of organised crime suffer from lack of clarity and
are open to a wide variety of interpretations.8 This ambiguity may be useful for
7 An overview of several organised crime definitions can be found here: http://www.organized-crime.de/
OCDEF1.htm (19-05-2009).
8 Ambiguous words are used in all the reports’ organised crime definitions, such as ‘considerable
importance’ or ‘considerable period of time’ ([7]: 5), ‘substantial planning’ ([5]: 7), etc.
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political purposes, but it makes the operationalisation of these definitions less reliable
and less valid. It is, for example, not always clear on what grounds some organised crime
activities or phenomena are included in the reports and others are not. IPOL ([20]: 16),
for example, bases its list of organised crime phenomena on the outcome of a working
group that involved representatives of the National Public Prosecutor, the Prosecutor
General, the Ministries of Home Affairs and Justice and IPOL itself. A different
working group might come up with a different list of phenomena.
The (validity) question is: are wemeasuring organised crime and not something else?
Since there is no consensus on the definition of organised crime, this question is difficult
to answer. A radical solution to this problem could be to accept the fact that organised
crime is a political construct and can only be studied if the researcher is willing to
embrace the official definition of the concept, as suggested by Van Dijck [11]. In such a
way, the official definition of organised crime—whatever it is—would be considered
valid a priori. However, this step implies acceptance of the fact that different countries
may have different—and sometimes contrasting—definitions of organised crime and
that the OCTAs cannot be compared with each other.
Threat
Two-third of the reports reviewed (six out of nine) aim to assess the threat of
organised crime (Table 1). This means that either the title of the report contains the
word ‘threat’, or that a threat assessment is carried out in the report. The Canadian,
Northern Ireland and UK OCTAs [6, 26, 34] contain neither a definition nor an
operationalisation of the word ‘threat’.9 Europol’s 2008 OCTA does not contain a
definition of threat either, but does present a list of seven indicators or attributes10
which, according to Europol, would make statements on the threat of organised
crime groups possible. However, the report does not explain how these indicators are
operationalised and why these indicators were chosen in the first place. Because
these four reports provide no definitions of threat, it is impossible to assess the
reliability or the validity of such definitions.
The remaining two OCTAs [7, 20] do put forward a definition of threat. However,
this does not rule out all doubts. In their 261-pages 2008 report, IPOL defines threat
in the following way:
As a threat will be considered those criminal activities, for which there are
proven indications that they will manifest themselves in the coming years in
the form of a more than a once-only cooperation of two or more persons that
together aim to make profits, that multiple crime groups are involved in those
criminal activities and that in their totality those activities will have serious
consequences for the Dutch society ([20]: 23, my translation).
The seriousness of the consequences is assessed by looking at ‘the expected
frequency of the criminal activity, the kind of consequences and the ease with which
the possible harm could be limited (controllability)’ (ibid.). The kind of consequences is
9 A definition of threat may be provided by the longer and confidential versions of the CISC and SOCA
reports but these are not available for public scrutiny.
10 Europol’s ([13]: 13) indicators are: international dimension, group structures, use of legitimate business
structures, specialization, influence, use of violence, and counter measures.
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divided into two main categories, direct harms (e.g. physical damage, property
damage) and indirect harms (e.g. prevention costs, damage to interests).
These definitions leave the reader with a few questions, particularly regarding the
criteria put forward to identify an organised crime activity as a threat. Multiple crime
groups must be involved in order for an activity to constitute a threat. How many
groups are to be involved? How many times does the activity have to be carried out?
And which consequences are serious enough to label an activity as a threat? IPOL
does not answer the first two questions in its report and comes up with a relativistic
answer to the last one: ‘There are no objective measures to determine the seriousness
of the consequences of a criminal activity. The judgement on the qualification is
based on intersubjectivity’ ([20]: 25, my translation).11
This is an honest and crucial remark. IPOL admits that it is impossible to
objectively determine the seriousness of the consequences of criminal activities.
From this, it logically follows that it is impossible to come up with an objective list
of threats. In other words, the list of threats presented by IPOL is in essence
arbitrary, because it represents what IPOL perceives as threatening. It is likely that a
different group of people—whether they be police analysts, academic researchers or
ordinary citizens—could come up with a different set of serious consequences of
organised crime and, consequently, with a different list of organised crime threats.
A different interpretation of the concept of threat can be found in the Belgian
OCTA. While IPOL considers the threat level of criminal phenomena, the DSB
focuses on criminal organisations:
To meet the conditions of a threat analysis of organised crime, it must be
determined what makes a criminal organisation threatening. A “good” criminal
organisation should be distinguished from a “bad” one, by using prudent criteria.
We have limited ourselves to two dimensions which, in our opinion, most
accurately reflect this threat: efficiency and durability. Organisation A poses a
larger threat than organisation B if it is efficient in developing its (il)legal
activities, but also turns out to have a longer durability ([7]: 13, my translation).
In a second step, the DSB translates these two dimensions, efficiency and durability of
the criminal group, into three variables each: the expertise, the dynamic of the group
and the reached performance for efficiency, and social cohesion, developed counter-
strategies and the flexibility or adaptive capacity in the case of durability ([7]: 13–16).
These six variables are further broken down into more variables, some of which are
still quite complicated (e.g. collective consciousness, organisational structure, know-
how, information position, etc.). In trying to operationalise the variables, the DSB
provides explanations, which are sometimes difficult to understand, such as ‘Thus, the
dynamic is linked to the decisive structure within the group and the rules that
influence the link between the different elements’ ([7]: 14, my translation).12 Despite
these operationalising efforts, no measurable components can be found in the DSB
12 This is a literal translation of the Dutch text.
11 The seriousness of the consequences of certain organised crime phenomena was established through the
so-called Delphi-method: a group of six individuals sat together and discussed whether or not the
consequences of a criminal phenomenon are serious enough to call it a threat ([20]: 25). The backgrounds
of these individuals and their expertise cannot be ascertained from the report. It seems inevitable that if the
group members would be replaced by others the outcome of the Delphi-method will be different.
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report. Therefore, the reader cannot trace back on what grounds certain groups are
labelled as a threat and others are not. Nor does the DSB explain why these variables
would accurately reflect the threat of organised crime groups. If efficient crime groups
make, for instance, fewer lethal casualties than inefficient ones, we could even argue
the opposite. Moreover, like IPOL, the DSB admits that this list of variables is based
on the opinion of the researchers ([7]: 13).
Admittedly, the definition of threat put forward by the Belgian DSB is still work
in progress. Despite this caveat, a fundamental question remains if the threat of
organised crime can be thoroughly assessed by focusing exclusively on criminal
groups and their characteristics (efficiency and durability) rather than on the criminal
activities they engage in (use of violence/corruption, number of crimes, nature of
crimes, etc.). We will return to this question in the final conclusions.
Risk and cost
Risk is the main concept of two reports produced by two crime commissions of the
Australian state of Queensland ([5, 28]), which assessed local illegal markets (and
activities, one should add) in 1999 and 2004: the markets for amphetamine, ecstasy,
cocaine, heroin, cannabis, GHB13 and prescription drugs as well as fraud, identity
crime, money laundering, property crime, motor vehicle rebirthing, and firearms.
The two commissions work with similar conceptions of risk. According to the 1999
report, ‘risk is determined by considering the intensity of the threat, how likely it is
to occur, and the seriousness of the consequences, should it occur. Integral to this
process is the identification of all those at risk and all sources of such risk’ ([28]: 30).
In the 2004 report, ‘risk is a function of the threat of an activity occurring and the
harmful consequences of that activity. Risk is commonly given a rating that is
expressed in qualitative14 terms from low to very high’ ([5]: 6). Several words, such
as intensity, threat, seriousness and harmful consequences require additional
explanation, but the reports provide only limited details.
The two Queensland commissions consider threat as a subdivision of risk and
offer the following formulae. Threat is defined as intent and capability, intent is
desire and confidence, and capability is resources and knowledge. Desire is
subdivided into motives and wishes (ibid.). Clearly, the two commissions interpret
threat in a different way than the Belgian and Dutch agencies: ‘Threat is effectively a
measure of how likely it is that a person or group will succeed in carrying out some
activity that may cause harm; and the likelihood of success depends on their intent and
capability’ ([5]: 6). The Australian definition focuses on groups as the Belgian DSB
does. However, the two Queensland commissions also consider the activities carried
out by these groups and make probability estimations to determine their threat level.
The measurement of the intent of criminal groups ‘relies on the analyst’s
judgement’ and is therefore rather subjective (ibid.). How intent is operationalised
cannot be found in the report. The question is what the analyst is supposed to judge
when judging a group’s intent. The group’s capability is assessed by looking at ‘the
14 The authors of the report do not explain what they mean by ‘qualitative’. If I understand them correctly,
they mean it as opposed to quantitative. Risk is not expressed in exact figures, but in discretionary
categories ranging from ‘low’ to ‘very high’.
13 Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid: a drug used mostly in the club and party scene.
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number and mix of people with the relevant skills and knowledge, and access to the
prerequisites for a particular type of criminal activity’ (ibid.). Though this
explanation gives us a clue on how to assess the capability of a group, it lacks
detail. What should we do, for example, if we want to compare the capability of one
group with that of another? Should we consider ‘skills’ to be more important or
relevant than ‘knowledge’ or would this not be correct? This is not explained in the
Australian reports. Given their original focus on illegal markets, it is also surprising
that the two Queensland commissions end up using a definition of threat that is
entirely group-oriented. The two commissions do not provide any clear explanation
for this choice nor do they explain how the threat posed by specific criminal groups
is used to establish whether an illegal market poses a low or high risk.
The study carried out by Dubourg and Prichard on behalf of the Home Office [8]
is the only one in our selection that attempts to calculate the (economic and social)
costs of organised crime activities.15 It singles out three different types of costs:
Costs in anticipation of crime include defensive expenditure (for example, on
Chip and Pin to help prevent credit card fraud) and precautionary behaviour and are
considered to be a cost of crime since they are based on the risk of becoming a
victim.
Costs as a consequence of crime include the value of property stolen or
damaged (for example, the value of plastic fraud), time costs of replacing
property, documents and so on, the emotional and physical impact and reduced
quality of life for victims, and reduced effectiveness at work for people
affected by crime. In cases where crime involves violence to the victim, health
costs fall on the NHS and other health service providers.
Costs in response to crime are numerous and relate generally to the criminal
justice system. This includes costs to police, the Crown Prosecution Service,
Magistrates and Crown Courts, legal aid and non legally-aided defence costs,
and costs to the prison and probation services ([8]: 2).
Dubourg and Prichard express all economic and social costs ‘in monetary terms even if
the underlying drivers are not themselves financial’ (ibid.). They justify their choice in
the following way: ‘Market size estimates provide some evidence of the likely resilience
of organised crime markets to disruption activities, and, supplemented with further
information concerning spending and saving habits, can give some indication of the
value of assets available for recovery. Estimates of the social and economic cost provide
an indication of the likely benefits to society of reducing organised crime activity, and
can thus, at a high level, assist resource prioritisation’ (ibid.: ii).
Is this tripartite classification of the costs of organised crime valid? In other
words, do these three classifications represent the costs of crime? Already at first
sight, it does not seem to be the case. Only the second category, namely the costs as
a consequence of crime, are direct costs of (organised) crime. The costs in
anticipation of crime as well as the costs in response to crime are not the result or
consequence of the crime itself, but of policy decisions, law enforcement priorities
15 In addition, the authors make market size estimates and assessments of the value of criminal assets
available for seizure.
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and public concern with specific crimes or types of crime. It could, for example, very
well be that governments or citizens take unnecessary and costly precautions
because a crime is feared, but does not present actual risks. Such costs should be
regarded as the costs of the fear of crime rather than costs of crime actually taking
place. We can apply a similar reasoning to the third category, costs in response to
crime. This category leads to a circular reasoning. The highest costs are ascribed to
those criminal activities that received the highest priority (highest anticipatory and
responsive costs) the previous year. This outcome is likely to further increase
attention from policymakers and law enforcement agencies, which leads to an
increase in resource allocation to this criminal activity, which leads to an even larger
increase of costs, which further increases law enforcement attention, etc., etc. What
Dubourg and Prichard are actually measuring is not the costs of organised crime
activities alone, but also the amount of money politicians are willing to spend on
certain crime problems and the costs resulting from public fear of crime. The
Dubourg and Prichard’s measurement of ‘costs of organised crime’ is invalid,
because they are not measuring what they intend to measure.
Even if we restrict ourselves to the costs as a consequence of crime, the actual
measurement can be difficult. Problems arise when we try to calculate the costs of
so-called imponderabilia, things or conditions on which we cannot put a price tag,
such as ‘emotional impact’ and ‘reduced quality of life’. Moreover, for some costs
the availability of reliable data is limited or non-existent. Dubourg and Prichard are
aware of these limitations: ‘Due to limited data, many of the valuations are
unavoidably very approximate, and subject to large margins of error – strong caveats
apply’ ([8]: ii). These limitations will become even more apparent when we discuss
the results of this and the other selected reports.
Reviewing the main findings of the OCTAs and similar reports
Even though the operationalisation of most of the key concepts leaves much to be
desired, let us now consider which activities or aspects of organised crime are
identified as the most serious, threatening or costly and why. As shown in the
previous section, there is no consensus on the unit of analysis among the authors of
the OCTAs and similar reports. Some of them, such as that of the Belgian DSB [7],
focus upon groups. Other ones, such as the IPOL OCTA [20] and the report by
Dubourg and Prichard [8] on behalf of the UK Home Office concentrate on criminal
activities, still other ones—for example the two Australian reports [5, 28]—focus on
markets. This dissension implies that many different things are thought to contribute
to the threat level of a group or activity, ranging from negative societal consequences
of an activity to the efficiency and durability of a criminal group.
Four reports of our sample, namely the DSB [7], CISC [6], SOCA [34] and
Europol [13], contain no systematic list of the threats or risks of organised crime,
although some of them pinpoint specific activities as particularly threatening.16 For
16 Often the content of these reports is limited to general (and unclear) statements such as: “The OC
environment in the EU is evolving and dynamic. Some non-EU-based groups seem to be displaying
characteristics of intermediary situations while others remain relatively purely non-EU-based” ([13]: 18).
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example, SOCA ([34]: 5) concludes that ‘drug trafficking, especially Class A drugs,
poses the single greatest threat to the UK’. Other reports reach more structured
conclusions. The IPOL [20] and OCTF [26] reports provide a list of threats, the two
Australian reports [5, 28] list risks and the Dubourg and Prichard study [8] contains
a list of organised crime costs (Table 2).
The contents of these lists vary. IPOL ([20]: 260, 261), for instance, identifies 17
different organised crime threats, ranging from the abuse of legitimate businesses to
cargo theft. The Northern Ireland OCTF ([26]: 25) singles out 11, ranging from
paramilitary involvement in organised crime to armed robbery. Despite the
differences in length, the lists of the Dutch [20] and Northern Irish [26] agencies
are partially overlapping: drugs, fraud, robberies and immigration crime are
considered threats in both reports. However, there are differences as well. For
example, the Northern Irish report considers extortion a threat, while the Dutch
report does not.17
In all five reports that do provide an explicit list of threats, risks or costs, drug
trafficking or the trafficking of a specific type of drug is regarded as posing a threat,
risk or (high) cost to society. IPOL, for example, labels cocaine trafficking as a
threat, because:
The consequences of trafficking cocaine are serious: the direct consequences
such as addiction problems as well as the indirect consequences which are
brought about by the illegal character of the cocaine market (money laundering,
corruption, intertwinements of legal and illegal sphere). Additionally, the
Netherlands’ role as a transit country in Europe is reason for concern. [...] The
size of the problem, the seriousness of the consequences and the expectation that
these will not change in the coming four years, make cocaine trafficking a threat
([20]: 37).
In its turn, the Northern Ireland OCTF considers drug trafficking threatening
because:
Organised criminal enterprises continue to make substantial amounts of money
through the illicit drugs market in Northern Ireland. The availability of illegal
drugs creates fear amongst parents and responsible members of our community
and causes a variety of social harms to individuals, families and communities.
The importation of drugs is dependent on transport routes and, once
established, these routes can provide a doorway for a variety of other illegal
commodities to enter the country, including counterfeit products and weapons
([26]: 32).
Clearly, the Dutch and Northern Irish agencies put forward different motivations to
justify why drug trafficking should be considered a threat. While both agencies
mention the consequences of drug abuse, IPOL stresses ‘the indirect consequences
resulting from the illegal character of the cocaine market’ and the OCTF highlights
17 This is remarkable, because in the Netherlands one of the key underworld figures, Willem Holleeder,
was recently sentenced to nine years imprisonment because of extortion. The case is widely regarded as
one of the most important recent criminal cases in the Netherlands. See: NRC Handelsblad ‘Holleeder
krijgt ook van hof 9 jaar’ (03-07-2009), available at http://www.nrc.nl/nieuwsthema/holleeder/
article2290138.ece/Holleeder_krijgt_ook_van_hof_9_jaar
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the size of illegal revenues and the fact that drug transport routes can be used for
other illegal commodities as well. The question is: who is right? Or is it just a matter
of opinion or perception?
The two Australian commissions [5, 28], assessing the risks of organised crime
markets, use a four-point scale: low, medium, high and very high risk. Only one
market is labelled as a very high risk: in 1999 the heroin market and in 2004 the
amphetamine market. As we have explained earlier, the risk assessment formula
used by the QCC and CMCQ is as follows: risk = threat and harm; threat = intent
and capability; intent = desire and confidence; capability = resources and
knowledge. In the 1999 report, resources, knowledge, desire, confidence, intent,
capability, threat and harm are all classified as ‘very high’ in the case of the heroin
market. This results in a ‘very high’ risk of the heroin market ([28]: 36). Why all
these variables score very high is not explained in the report. The report does
provide statements such as ‘The harms, and collateral social costs, associated with
the abuse of heroin are far-reaching and diverse’ ([28]: 34). However, it is not clear
what this means for the risk calculation. Nor is it clear what ‘high risk’ means,
because neither the 1999 nor the 2004 report puts forward clear criteria for its four-
point risk scale.
The four reports that all consider drug trafficking a threat or (very high) risk have
one problem in common: their conclusions cannot be falsified. The Northern Ireland
OCTF [26] and the two Australian commissions [5, 28] do not explain on the basis
of which criteria some organised crime activities or markets are considered a threat
or risk and others are not. IPOL ([20]: 25) does define threat but as it admits itself,
determining the seriousness of consequences of a criminal activity is ‘a matter of
intersubjectivity’, that is a normative decision, for which there are no objective
criteria.
Focusing on the costs of organised crime, Dubourg and Prichard ([8]: iii) estimate
the costs of ‘drugs’ at a staggering £15,4 billion (€15,6 billion). This estimation is
based on two studies [16, 17], whose authors tried to make cost calculations of drug
use, using estimates of the amount of users, and healthcare and criminal justice costs
per user. However, Dubourg and Prichard’s original aim was to assess the costs of
organised crime, which is not the same as the costs of drug use. When we speak
about organised crime and drugs, we speak about drug trafficking and it is the costs
of this activity that need to be assessed and not the costs of drug use. Drug use is not
organised crime, nor are drug use-related healthcare problems consequences of
organised crime; they are consequences of drug use. Moreover, as mentioned earlier,
assessing criminal justice costs to prevent and combat drug trafficking does not give
us insight into the costs of the organised crime activity of drug trafficking, as instead
lost tax revenues do in the case of VAT-fraud. By assessing criminal justice costs, we
get insight into last year’s law enforcement and judicial priorities. A cost assessment
of organised crime, however, should determine if the costs of a certain organised
crime activity are higher (or lower) than those of another activity, irrespective of the
law enforcement priority that is given to the activity at the present or in the past.
In spite of these difficulties, Dubourg and Prichard’s method has some potential.
As mentioned earlier, it avoids the difficulties that come along when trying to
operationalise normative concepts such as threat or seriousness. Moreover, monetary
figures can be more easily compared, as in the case of the healthcare costs for
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victims or perpetrators, environmental costs, tax losses, etc. However, it is very
difficult to come up with even a rough measurement of all costs of organised crime.
There are many imponderabilia, such as loss of confidence in the state, declining
rule of law, psychological impact, etc., that cannot be translated into hard figures and
therefore cannot be measured in this way. Moreover, for many types of costs, there
are hardly any reliable data available; sometimes there are no data at all.
Governments and scientists using this method should thus focus on those organised
crime costs that can be more easily translated into monetary figures and for which
some reliable data are available.
Assessing the scientific literature
In addition to governmental reports, there is a limited amount of scientific literature
on how to assess the threats and risks of organised crime (Table 3).18 This literature
has been primarily developed by Belgian and Dutch authors [22, 24, 36], with some
North American contributions as well [1, 31]. Despite the predominantly academic
origin, this body of work is plagued by the same methodological problems that
emerged during the review of the OCTAs and similar reports. The definition of key
concepts is often missing. For example, no definition of the key concept of threat is
provided by Klerks [22], the RCMP [31] or Albanese [1]. Even when they are
present, the operational definitions of key concepts are too unclear to render them
reliable (e.g, [24]: 29; [36]: 483) or they rely on an arbitrary choice of indicators so
that their validity must be questioned [1, 22, 31].
The Dutch public administration scientist Jan Kortekaas, for example, tries to
identify ‘the risks of changes in organised crime that flow from ICT developments’
([24]: 15, my translation). Mirroring the definition of risk of the two Queensland
commissions [5, 28], Kortekaas conceptualises risk as ‘the combination of the
probability that a threat will manifest itself and its unwanted consequences’ ([24]: 21).
However, he merely defines threat as ‘something undesirable’ ([24]: 29). Kortekaas
proposes a two-step risk analysis: first, threats are identified and in the next step they
are assessed or judged. According to him, the threats can be identified by (speaking
with) experts or by studying open sources ([24]: 29). The threats can be judged by
assessing their probability and identifying their undesirable consequences. Again, the
analyst must rely on experts’ judgement ([24]: 30). The probability should be judged
in terms of ‘high’ or ‘low’; the undesirable consequences in terms of ‘serious’ or ‘not
serious.’ Kortekaas does not put forward any criteria which could be used to label
something as a threat. The only clue he provides us is that a threat needs to be
‘something undesirable’ ([24]: 29), entrusting the selection entirely to ‘experts’.
However, he does not explain who those experts are and what their expertise might be.
In a recent attempt to develop a market and product-based model to determine
threat levels or risks of organised crime, the U.S. criminologist Jay Albanese ([1]:
263, 264) places much emphasis on the importance of defining organised crime, but
does not properly define either risk or threat, which he ends up using as synonyms.
18 We have limited ourselves to Dutch and English-language literature on threat or risk assessment of
organised crime.
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Specifically, Albanese tries ‘to predict incidents of organised crime’ in certain illegal
markets, however he does not explain what he means by ‘incidents of organized
crime’. Rather than relying on law enforcement sources, he suggests that ‘surveys at
the local level could be conducted to determine the circumstances surrounding the
supply, demand, regulation, and competition for various illicit products in specific
jurisdictions. For example, local citizen, business, police, and perhaps offender
surveys could be used to help measure perceptions of supply, demand, regulation,
and competition for particular illicit products’ ([1]: 271). He translates these four
areas (supply, demand, regulation and competition) into ten indicators19 which,
according to him, would for each illicit market predict the threat level (the number of
incidents) of organised crime. Except for the self-evident indicators ‘history of
organised crime in market’ and ‘demand for product’, it is difficult to see how the
other eight indicators— such as objective availability of product or service, elastic/
inelastic nature of demand, profitability, harm ([1]: 270)—could predict the incidents
of organised crime in illicit markets. Nor does Albanese explain this.
The methods developed by the Dutch political scientist Peter Klerks [22] and by
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the so-called Sleipnir method; [31]) have much
in common and are both much more scientifically solid than the two first studies
reviewed here. The two methods consist of an instrument to assess the threat posed
by a criminal group. Although both of them leave the key concept of threat
undefined, they do provide a list of attributes—19 in the case of the RCMP, 28 in the
case of Klerks—on which a group can be scored. The higher the score, the more
19 Ease of entry into market, law enforcement capability, government corruption level, objective
availability of product or service, ease of movement/sale, current demand for product, elastic/inelastic
nature of demand, history of organized crime in market, profitability, harm ([1]: 270).
Table 3 Methods to assess organised crime threat and risk
Title Author Main
concept
Definition
main concept?
How to measure
main concept?
Risk Assessment in Organized
Crime: Developing a Market and
Product-based Model to Determine
Threat Levels (article - 2008)
Albanese, J. Risk No Attribute list
Risky Business (article - 2004) Vander Beken, T. Risk Yes Attribute list and
other methods
Groot in de Hasj: Theorie en
Praktijk van de Georganiseerde
Criminaliteit (dissertation - 2000)
Klerks, P. Threat No Attribute list
Risicoanalyse Georganiseerde
Misdaad. Uitwerking
Instrumentarium en Toepassing
op de ICT-ontwikkelingen
(dissertation - 2005)
Kortekaas, J. Threat Yes Interviewing experts
Sleipnir: the Long Matrix for
Organized Crime (law
enforcement document - 2000)
Royal Canadian
Mounted Police
Threat No Attribute list
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threatening a group is. Some of these attributes overlap, whereas some are different:
‘sophistication’, ‘violence’ and geographic scope are mentioned in both studies. On
the contrary, the attribute ‘monopoly’, that is ‘control over one or more specific
criminal activities within a geographic area of operations, with no tolerance for
competition’ is mentioned only by the RCMP ([31]: 28) and not by Klerks.
In Klerks’ study, the selection of these variables is based on his own opinion and
in a footnote Klerks honestly admits that because of this ‘an instrument like this can
lead to serious differences of opinion’ ([22]: 449). Moreover, he assigns different
scoring ranges to different variables ([22]: 442–453). For instance, the variable
‘place of business’ (does the group operate on a local or global level?) has a scoring
range from 0 to 26, while the variable ‘use of violence’ has a range from 0 to 5 ([22]:
442–453). Consequently, the score on the attribute ‘place of business’ adds
significantly more to the final score of the threat level of a criminal group than
many other attributes. Apparently, Klerks deems the criminal groups’ place of
business as adding more to the threat level of a criminal group than its use of
violence, but he does not give a justification for his choices. Nor does he provide
clear instructions to decide which score a group should receive for each variable.20
Because of this insufficient information, Klerks’ method remains arbitrary and, if
applied, may easily lead to a false sense of objectivity.
In the RCMP project, each attribute receives a score on a four-point scale: high,
medium, low and nil (and if no data is available: unknown) ([31]: 17). To each score
a rank-ordered value is linked. For instance, a group that scores ‘high’ on the
attribute ‘corruption’, which stands at the top of the ranking, receives a score of 76; a
group that scores ‘high’ on the attribute ‘links to criminal extremist groups’, which
stands at the bottom of the ranking, receives a score of only 4. In other words,
‘corruption’ is thought to contribute very much to the threat-level of a group and
‘links to criminal extremist groups’ very little. If a group scores ‘medium’ on an
attribute, it receives half the score of ‘high’. So a group that scores ‘medium’ on
‘corruption’ receives a score of 38. If a group scores ‘low’ on an attribute, it receives
half the score of medium and a group receives no score at all in the case an attribute
is assessed as ‘nil’.
The RCMP used a so-called Delphi-survey amongst Canadian law enforcement
officers working on organised crime to identify, define and rank-order the attributes.
Through this survey law enforcement officers were asked to give their opinion on
the attribute list. This survey was repeated several times until some sort of consensus
was reached. The RCMP provides a definition for each attribute and also provides
criteria for each score (high, medium, low, nil). However, some of these criteria are
open to interpretation. To receive, for example, a ‘medium’ score on corruption, a
group should show ‘some ability to infiltrate or corrupt police’ ([22]: 23), where
‘some ability’ is not further determined. The vagueness of such definitions inevitably
reduces the reliability of the whole exercise.
Even leaving aside this, the Slepinir method suffers from the limitations typical of
the Delphi method (see [33]): as in the case of IPOL’s [20] attempt to determine
20 Take for instance the variable ‘sophistication’, which has a scoring range from 0 to 5 and indicates
whether or not a group uses special techniques (e.g. smuggling techniques) ([22]: 442–453). The question
is on what grounds a criminal group would receive a score of, for instance, 3 instead of 4 or 5? No clear
explanation can be found in Klerks’ text.
Organised crime threat assessments: a critical review 79
whether or not a criminal phenomenon is a threat, the consensus-based list of attributes
is rooted in intersubjectivity. The RCMP’s list probably gives a good reflection of the
threat that Canadian law enforcement officers believe organised crime groups pose to
them and to the Canadian society. However, other Canadian citizens or scientists might
have different views on what makes crime groups threatening. Because of this, the
RCMP’s list of attributes that determine the perceived threat-level of organised crime
groups is not valid for the entire Canadian society, but only for (a part of) the
Canadian law enforcement. Representatives of other law enforcement agencies,
scientists or the general public in Canada or elsewhere might select other attributes or
rank them in a different order. For example, the question if corruption makes organised
crime groups more threatening than the use of violence is open for debate, as it is
basically not a scientific but a normative decision.
As single organised crime groups constitute the unit of analysis of both studies, it
is also fair to ask if these methods can fulfil the RCMP’s ([31]: 5) claim to constitute
a ‘strategic intelligence assessment’ which can be used to ‘inform the deliberations
of senior managers setting priorities in our efforts against organized crime’. With
few exceptions, organised crime groups in Canada as in most other western
developed countries are rather ephemeral and do not last long enough to become the
target of long-term law enforcement strategies. Although it is not made explicit, this
is probably also a reason why many OCTAs and similar reports reviewed here focus
on criminal activities rather than on criminal groups. Which individual groups need
to be prioritized by law enforcement seems to be a task of tactical rather than
strategic analysis.
In an attempt to help policy makers set priorities, Tom Vander Beken and his
Ghent colleagues [32, 36, 37] put forward the most ambitious method, including an
environmental scan, an estimation of criminal networks, which draws on the
methods developed by Klerks and RCMP, and an analysis of legal and illegal
markets. ‘What is required’—writes Vander Beken ([36]: 479) in his most recent
article on the topic—‘is a consideration not just of organized crime groups in
isolation, nor of illicit markets in isolation, but an analysis of the interdependencies
between these elements and the wider economic spectrum’. While attractive for the
broad picture it promises to draw, Vander Beken’s risk-based21 approach presents
some of the difficulties discussed in the previous studies and adds to them new ones,
as it does not succeed in providing clear and reproducible—that is reliable—
instructions for the tripartite analysis it suggests.
The environmental scan, for example, ‘seeks to identify the major relevant trends
in the external environment and the overall objectives, or posture, of the agencies
involved’ ([36]: 487). Vander Beken does not explain which (major relevant) trends
he is referring to, nor is it clear what should be understood by ‘the external
environment’. He states that the environment can be subdivided into four domains:
political, economical, social and technological, however this is still very broad.
Indeed, a few examples of trends are mentioned (e.g. crime trends, demographics,
legislative changes), but Vander Beken does not provide a list. Because of this,
almost anything could be meant by, for instance, the social domain ([36]: 489).
21 Vander Beken defines risk as: ‘the chance of something—positive and/or negative—happening that will
have an impact on objectives’ ([36]: 483).
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As Klerks [22] and the RCMP [31], Vander Beken too aims to rank criminal
groups according to their threat level. His definition of threat is identical to the one
used by the Australian CMCQ [5]. The threat level of a group can, according to
Vander Beken, be determined by assessing the group’s desire, expectations22,
resources and knowledge. According to him, these four variables can be translated
into attributes on which criminal groups can score. The selection of these attributes
is based on the lists constructed by Klerks [22] and the RCMP [31]. In this way
Vander Beken creates his own list of 21 attributes.23 For instance, a criminal group’s
desire (to engage in illegal activities) can, according to Vander Beken, be assessed
by assessing a group’s discipline, intelligence gathering, deadly violence, violence,
and monopoly ([36]: 494). However, Vander Beken does not further explain these
attributes, nor does he translate them into empirical counting units, making it rather
difficult to interpret their meaning. He presents the attributes as if they would self-
evidently provide an accurate picture of the threat-level of organised crime groups,
but he gives no justification for his choices.
To gain a full picture, Vander Beken also suggests making an analysis of legal and
illegal markets. According to him, ‘the actual levels of organized criminal
involvement in illicit markets’ ([36]: 495) can be ascertained by looking at ‘law
enforcement intelligence, prior history of involvement, prosecutions, etc.’ as well as
‘an appreciation of the dynamics of the markets’ ([36]: 499). Vander Beken suggests
carrying out this part of the analysis on a macro- as well as micro-level of the market
and puts forward several areas (e.g. demographic statistics, the threat of substitute
products, business and health) out of which indicators can be extracted which would
provide insight into the dynamics of the market in question. ([36]: 502). Why Vander
Beken chooses specifically for those areas remains (at least partially) unclear. The
indicators on the micro-level supposedly give insight into the functioning of the
market ([36]: 497). The reasons behind the choice of the indicators on the macro-
level, however, remain a mystery. Why, for instance, would it be important to extract
indicators from the area of ‘business and health’? How could these indicators
provide better insight into the dynamics of an illegal market? These choices are not
grounded properly, giving this part of the method a rather arbitrary character.24
An alternative approach
The objective of most OCTAs is to provide policymakers with information that can
be used to set strategic, i.e. long-term priorities. Therefore, we would argue that it
makes more sense to regard organised crime as activities instead of criminal groups.
As explained earlier, criminal groups are often ephemeral and once busted by the
24 This third part of Vander Beken’s approach also includes a method to assess the vulnerability of
legitimate markets to organised crime, which is not discussed here.
22 The CMCQ ([5]: 6) uses the word confidence instead.
23 Discipline, intelligence gathering, deadly violence, violence, monopoly, sophistication, risk attitude,
accessibility for law enforcement, strategy, insulation, corruption, size of group, working with other
groups, local or global, scope, level of finances, mobility, expertise, infiltration, continuity, and multiple
enterprises ([36]: 494).
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police, usually dissolve. Organised crime activities on the other hand are here to stay
and therefore much more useful for strategic priority setting.25
Another key objective is to rank these activities. In the studies here reviewed,
these rankings are based on the threat-level, riskiness or costliness of organised
crime. In other words, these reports try to rank organised crime groups or activities
for their ‘badness’. The point is that deciding what constitutes a threat and what does
not, is a normative decision and opinions cannot be falsified. That corruption is
worse or more threatening than the use of violence cannot be falsified. If the RCMP
[31] or Klerks [22] develops lists of the most threatening organised crime groups in
some geographical areas, these lists cannot be falsified. It is logically impossible to
falsify the outcome of their research, because the underlying criteria which are used
to determine whether or not a group is threatening are subjective.26 One could argue
that assessing the threat of organised crime groups with a list of attributes is valid, as
long as the researcher explicitly admits that he or she realises that his/her list is just
one way of measuring threat. However, in that case, would we not have to conclude
that any list of attributes is suitable to measure the threat of organised crime? The
meaning of the words ‘threats/risks of organised crime’ would become hyper-
referential (each person has his own interpretation) and therefore meaningless.
The concept of cost seems to be much more neutral and clearer. However, the so-
called imponderabilia, such as loss of confidence in the state, declining rule of law,
psychological impact, etc. prevent us from calculating all the costs. These costs
probably matter to policy makers, but cannot be objectively and accurately
measured. Moreover, on many types of costs we have only partial or no data at
all, making it impossible to give serious estimations. This method only seems
promising if we limit ourselves to measuring things that are easily translatable into
monetary figures and on which there is a reasonable amount of reliable data. For
example, serious estimations have been made on the profits from drug trafficking (e.g.
[30, 35]). To measure other variables we should try to come up with a less ambitious,
but more feasible approach.
In theory it should be possible to rank organised crime activities on separate
variables such as the number of deaths directly caused by the activity. In principle,
any variable could be compared amongst different organised crime activities, as long
as they are measurable and a reasonable amount of reliable evidence is available
(which may not always be the case). It only makes sense to compare, for example,
the number of deaths of two (or more) organised crime activities if we have reliable
death toll figures for both of them and if there is a reasonable degree of certitude that
these murders/deaths were directly caused by the activity under scrutiny, e.g. large
scale drug trafficking. A first source for finding such evidence would be official
26 In a similar way we could, for example, try to assess the tastiness of desserts. We could come up with a
list of attributes which we believe influence the tastiness of desserts, such as sweetness, colour, texture, or
temperature, using different scoring ranges for each attribute and rank ‘sweetness’ higher than
‘temperature’. We could provide reliable definitions of these attributes, so that other researchers could
accurately repeat our research and come up with similar findings. However, what would we measure if we
would use such a research method? Would we really have measured the tastiness of desserts? Would it be
a valid way of measuring tastiness?
25 For pragmatic reasons discussed in section ‘Assessing the reliability and validity of the definition of key
concepts’ we suggest that researchers use governmental definitions of organised crime.
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statistics (e.g. police statistics). A second option would be to interview experts, such
as police officers working for drug units or drug traffickers themselves. Such
interviews should provide us with at least a rough idea of how violent organised
crime drug markets are, but comparisons with other organised crime markets would
be tricky, because such interviews probably will not provide us with very accurate
estimates. A third source of evidence would be criminal case files and a fourth and
final source would be open sources, such as the media and research reports.
Combined, these sources could give us at least a rough image of a number of
variables that could be interesting for policy makers, such as the use of violence
within certain organised crime activities. We could probably even make tentative
comparisons between different organised crime activities on separate variables
without having to make normative judgments. Policymakers can then decide for
themselves whether violence is worse than corruption or vice versa and rank the
criminal activities accordingly.
Conclusions
That policymakers want to base the priorities they assign to law enforcement
agencies on the basis of a transparent and scientific assessment is praiseworthy—and
as such the OCTAs recently produced by governmental agencies and the methods
developed by scholars and others cannot but be welcomed. Scientific rigour can
improve such attempts by making sure at the very least that operational definitions
of all key concepts are provided and that they are reliable and to the extent possible
also valid.
In organised crime threat assessments and similar reports various things are
investigated. Some of the studies focus on organised crime groups, others on
activities, markets or phenomena. According to one OCTA, organised crime
phenomena are more threatening when their consequences are more serious [20],
according to another, organised crime groups pose a higher threat when they are
more efficient and durable [7]. Some researchers state that one needs 28 attributes
[22] to determine the threat of a crime group, others think 21 [36] or 19 [31]
attributes are sufficient. Some researchers assert these attributes need scoring
ranges in ranked order [31], others do not [22]. Who is right? Which agency or
researcher is truly measuring the threats of organised crime? Or is it all just a
matter of taste and can we interpret and define ‘threat’ and ‘organised crime’ in
whatever way we like?
This cacophony is partially due to the ambiguous nature of the very concept of
organised crime, a concept that has yet to find a definition on which an academic
and/or political consensus could develop (see [14]). That explains why some studies
reviewed here choose groups and other ones activities, markets or phenomena as the
exemplary building block of organised crime. The ambiguity is further enhanced by
the fact that the concepts of threat and risk are difficult to operationalise, because in
essence these are normative concepts, like danger, tastiness or prettiness.
The ambiguity of these key concepts makes their operationalisation difficult.
Therefore also, most governmental reports and scholarly methods reviewed here do
not provide reliable and valid operational definitions in their attempts to assess the
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threats, risks or costs of organised crime. Four out of the nine governmental reports
evaluated do not even provide a definition of their key concept [6, 13, 26, 34]. Those
that do [5, 7, 20, 28] mostly define their key concept(s) in such a way that it raises
new questions. How to measure, for instance, the efficiency or durability [7] or
intent and capability [5] of a criminal group? The governmental reports here
evaluated provide insufficient information on these matters. Therefore, their analyses
are not reproducible and hence not reliable. Similar defects can also be found in the
attempts of a few scholars to develop threat or risk assessment methods. Klerks [22]
and Albanese [1] do not provide a definition of their main concept and those that do
[24, 36] provide insufficient explanation.
The RCMP [31] does not define threat, but does provide detailed information on
the attribute list which is used to identify and rank-order threatening organised crime
groups. Unlike Klerks, the RCMP explains the scoring ranges as well. However, no
matter how detailed the instructions for assigning different scores on each attribute
may be, the selection of the attributes themselves and their ranking are inevitably
subjective and thus arbitrary decisions. Is a criminal group that corrupts officials
worse than a criminal group using violence? According to Canadian law
enforcement officers involved in the Sleipnir project it is ([31]: 3). How do they
substantiate this conclusion? Well, it is their shared opinion on a list of attributes.
Other groups in society might well develop different attribute lists. The fact that
Vander Beken [36] and Klerks [22] come up with different lists and different scoring
ranges is evidence of that.
We believe it would be more productive if researchers avoid vague wording such
as threat and risk and use words and concepts on which there is a significant amount
of consensus instead. Although the elaboration of their method could be improved
Dubourg and Prichard (2007) step in the right direction by using monetary figures in
their estimations. However, their methodology cannot be applied on the so-called
imponderabilia. Therefore, their method should only be applied on the measurement
of variables which can be expressed in monetary terms. For other variables, such as
the use of violence within organised crime markets, we should use separate counting
units (e.g. number of murders). By combining different sources we should be able to
gain at least a rough picture of various variables within these activities, such as the
use of violence. In that way we can make tentative comparisons amongst different
organised crime activities on single variables, without having to make normative
decisions.
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